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A commentary on
Commentary: Stabilizing Constructs through Collaboration across Different Research Fields as
a Way to Foster the Integrative Approach of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project
by Glannon, W. (2016). Front. Hum. Neurosci. 10:363. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2016.00363
Glannon (2016) argues that mechanistic explanations are reductive and thus not good models
for understanding the environmentally situated dynamic causal relationships characteristic of
psychopathological phenomena. He rejects my claim that the Research Domain Criteria Project’s
(RDoC’s) success is contingent on the collective stabilization of RDoC constructs (Sullivan, 2016)
because he takes construct stabilization to be a requirement applying exclusively to mechanistic
explanations. Here, I argue that the dynamic causal relationships Glannon describes require
evidential support and construct stabilization has an important role to play in establishing these
relationships.
Glannon offers several illustrations of dynamic causal relationships. He explains that acute or
chronic psychosocial stress can cause dysregulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA)
axis, which increases cortisol levels in the brain. Excess cortisol can contribute to neuronal
degeneration in brain areas like prefrontal cortex, which can have deleterious effects on cognition,
mood regulation, and motivation.
In support of these dynamic causal relationships, Glannon cites a research study (Höhne et al.,
2014) that operationalizes “psychosocial stress” with an experimental paradigm known as The Trier
Social Stress Test (TSST). The TSST is “a public speaking task involving a mock job interview and
mental arithmetic” (2014, p. 269). In the version of the task used in this study, “participants were
given a 10-min preparation time for a presentation about their professional education,” which they
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had to give “in front of a mixed-gender panel of two judges” who
withheld “verbal and non-verbal feedback” (2014, p. 269).
I consulted this research study directly because Glannon
does not explain what “psychosocial stress” is. Although the
authors of the study indicate the TSST produces psychosocial
stress, they define it operationally by means of the TSST.
This leaves several questions unanswered: What is psychosocial
stress? Are there different types? Do all types activate the
same cascades of events (e.g., psychological/cognitive, cellular,
molecular)? What types of phenomena are produced using the
TSST? How do these phenomena compare with phenomena
produced by other psychosocial stress-inducing experimental
paradigms?
Two exemplary meta-analyses contain some responses
to these questions. Dickerson and Kemeny, for example,
focused on 208 studies investigating “the effects of
psychosocial stressors on cortisol activation” (Dickerson
and Kemeny, 2004, p. 355). Their motivation was that cortisol
changes are not “uniformly triggered” across experimental
paradigms used to induce psychosocial stress, so they
wanted to determine what features set some experimental
paradigms apart. They claim those experimental paradigms
accompanied by the greatest increases in cortisol placed
subjects in situations where they were “in danger of negative
evaluation of important and valued aspects of [themselves]
by others” (“social-evaluative threat”) and were unable to
control situation outcome (“outcome uncontrollability”)
(2004, p. 377).
Dickerson and Kemeny’s study is suggestive that not all
experimental paradigms used to study the relationship between
psychosocial stress and cortisol responses are equivalent. Insofar
as task demands or type of stressors differ across experimental
paradigms, it is likely that different cascades of events (e.g.,
psychological/cognitive, neurophysiological) are triggered when
subjects are trained in them. Dickerson and Kemeny also
indicate that if we use the word “stress in a vague and diffuse
way” these differences may be obscured and “prevent[] focused
research on specific kinds of threats that can affect health-
relevant physiological systems” (Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004, p.
377).
A second meta-analysis undertaken by Frisch and colleagues
addresses the question of what phenomena the TSST measures.
They regard the fact that the “scope of the TSST is limited
to inducing [...] social-evaluative threat” (2015, p. 12) as a
weakness. They also claim that because the TSST contains
“two-stress-inducing-elements” namely, social evaluation
and uncontrollability, it is difficult to determine whether
each element has “independent effects” downstream (e.g.,
on psychological/cognitive processes or neurophysiological
processes). Despite these weaknesses they assert that “the
TSST protocol is highly standardized” and this “high degree
of standardization allows for comparisons between different
studies in one field of research” which “facilitates the integration
of these findings in reviews and meta-analysis” and allows for
“the replication and extension of previous studies” (Frisch et al.,
2015, p. 12). At best, what can be concluded on the basis of
Frisch and colleagues’ analysis is that the TSST may be a valuable
experimental paradigm for studying the relationship between
social-evaluative threats and neurophysiological stress responses.
These two meta-analyses taken in combination lend
support to my argument that establishing causal claims—
whether dynamic or mechanistic—requires the collective
stabilization of the terms those claims contain and phenomena
to which they make reference. If RDoC is to promote
precision medicine in the clinic and the RDoC matrix
includes terms that do not have explicit shared definitions
or terms that are operationalized differently across research
studies and investigators, then how can clinicians learn
how to effectively deploy these terms to determine which
causal relationships are relevant and which therapeutic
interventions will be most effective for treating their
patients?
These two studies also point to strategies that may facilitate
progress with respect to psychological constructs in general, and
that may promote progress with respect to RDoC constructs
in particular. Specifically, investigators need to be clear about
how they are generally defining terms and what phenomena
their experimental paradigms may be used to produce, detect,
and measure. They also need to strike a balance between
implementing measures that will facilitate the replicability of
their results (Sochat et al., 2016) while not preventing the
possibility of novel discoveries.
On a final note, DSM-5 categories may be understood
as “diagnostic kinds” (Tabb, 2015); DSM authors have taken
measures to stabilize the use and meanings of DSM terms
across clinicians (Haslam, 2013). RDoC constructs lack this
kind of stability– they are “research kinds”, which are
heuristics subject to change in light of new discoveries
(Bechtel and Richardson, 1993/2010; Cuthbert and Insel, 2013).
If precision medicine is RDoC’s aim, application of terms
designating “research kinds” in clinical contexts will require
at least a minimal degree of stability, otherwise clinicians
will potentially run the risk of misdiagnosing their patients
and providing them with inadequate medical care. I only
am advocating for changes to investigative, conceptual and
integrative practices that may facilitate the precision medicine
goal.
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